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Putting Amotion in Motion:
Removal of an Elected Official by a
Municipal Governing Body for Just Cause
CATHRYN M. LITTLE*
INTRODUCTION

When an elected official has been sworn into office, and subsequently becomes unfit to hold office or engages in misconduct which
could rise to the level of "just cause" for removal from his elected position, a legal question arises regarding the grounds and procedure
through which a municipal governing body may legally remove that
official from office under North Carolina law. Since North Carolina
has no statutory provision outlining the procedure for removal of an
elected municipal official for misconduct or lack of fitness to hold
office subsequent to election, the answer is found in the common law.
This Article will examine the development and application of North
Carolina common law addressing the removal of an elected municipal
official through the process of "amotion." Amotion is recognized as an
"inherent power" of the governing body of a municipal corporation to
remove an elected official for reasonable and just cause due to misconduct or unfitness to hold office.'
Part L.A summarizes the development of North Carolina common
law that establishes amotion as a distinct action and supports its continued validity as a legitimate procedural method for removing an
elected official for just cause in a municipal corporate government setting. Part I.B provides a summary of North Carolina common law and
statutory provisions distinguishing actions for amotion, those in the
nature of quo warranto, and those seeking a writ of mandamus, in
order to provide a clear understanding of their distinct purposes and
applications.
* The author is a partner with the law firm of Little & Little, PLLC, in Raleigh,
North Carolina, and is licensed to practice law in North Carolina, Florida, Virginia,
and the District of Columbia. Her legal practice focuses on insurance defense and
coverage, including the defense of municipalities across North Carolina.
1. See State ex rel. Burke v. Jenkins, 61 S.E. 608, 609 (N.C. 1908) (recognizing
that "[t]he power to remove a corporate officer from his office for reasonable and just
cause is one of the common-law incidents of all corporations"); Ellison v. Aldermen of
Raleigh, 89 N.C. 125, 128 (1883) (recognizing that a municipal corporation has the
inherent power of amotion, to be exercised by its governing board).
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Part lI.A of this Article updates the reasoning from the original
North Carolina amotion cases with a more recent decision addressing
the process of amotion in an area beyond the limited context of municipal officials, and utilizing procedures consistent with the due process
concepts of providing notice and an opportunity to be heard. Part II.B
provides a discussion of decisions from jurisdictions outside North
Carolina that have approved the removal process for elected municipal
officials under the laws of their respective states, consistent with due
process concepts.
Part III provides practical guidelines for instituting the process of
amotion consistent with due process concerns, and for bringing the
process of removal of an elected municipal official to a successful conclusion so that it should withstand subsequent certiorari review concerning any potential errors of law.
I.

DEVELOPMENT OF NORTH CAROLINA COMMON LAW
ESTABLISHING AMOTION FOR REMOVAL OF AN
ELECTED OFFICIAL FOR JUST CAUSE

The North Carolina General Statutes do not provide any guidance
for the removal of municipal officials who are elected by the people.
Under section 160A-148(1), municipal managers (i.e., for a city, town,
or village) are vested with statutory authority to "appoint and suspend
or remove all city officers and employees not elected by the people."'
By implication, municipal managers lack the statutory authority to
suspend or remove municipal officials who are elected by the people.3
This is problematic when, after a municipal official is elected and
takes office, he engages in misconduct that should warrant removal
from office, or when that official otherwise becomes unfit to hold
office. The solution is found in North Carolina's common law, which
provides judicial guidance addressing the removal of municipal elected
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-148(1) (2007). Section 160A-148 states:
The manager shall be the chief administrator of the city. He shall be responsible to the council for administering all municipal affairs placed in his
charge by them, and shall have the following powers and duties:
(1) He shall appoint and suspend or remove all city officers and employees not elected by the people, and whose appointment or removal is not otherwise provided for by law, except the city attorney, in accordance with such
general personnel rules, regulations, policies, or ordinances as the council
may adopt.
Id. (emphasis added).
3. Id. § 160A-148(1).
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officials through the process of amotion, based upon grounds constituting reasonable and just cause for removal from office.4
A.

North Carolina Common Law Establishing Amotion
as a Distinct Action

In order to comprehend and apply the common law process of
amotion, it is essential to understand that amotion is a common law
action enabling a municipal governing body to remove an elected official for reasonable and just cause. It is an intrinsic right of all corporations, and therefore available to incorporated municipalities. Near the
turn of the century, two North Carolina Supreme Court decisions, Ellison v. Aldermen of Raleigh and State ex rel. Burke v. Jenkins, explicitly
recognized and explained the amotion doctrine.5
In Ellison, the court recognized that a municipal corporation has
the "inherent" power of amotion to be exercised by its governing board
"to remove a corporate officer from his office for reasonable and just
cause."6 The plaintiff, a former city alderman contesting his removal
from office, filed an application for a writ of mandamus. 7 At a board
meeting attended by the plaintiff, another aldermen offered a resolution vacating or declaring vacant the plaintiffs seat on the grounds of
his alleged "incompetency" to hold a local office because he simultaneously held an office with the United States Government.8 The plaintiff
was not allowed an opportunity to be heard or to vote on the matter,
and after the resolution passed, he was removed from office.9
The Ellison court observed that "[t]he power to remove a corporate
officer from his office for reasonable and just cause . . .is one of the

common law incidents of all corporations."'0 The court declared that
the "power of amotion is incident to a corporation,"and that "this exer4. Amotion is distinguished from a challenge to a municipal official's legal capacity or qualification to hold title to the office, which is brought in the name of the state
as an action in quo warranto as provided under Chapter 1 of the North Carolina General Statutes. See id. §§ 1-514, 1-515, 1-516, 1-522, 1-528.
5. See State ex rel. Burke v. Jenkins, 61 S.E. 608, 609 (N.C. 1908) ("The power to
remove a corporate officer from his office for reasonable and just cause is one of the
common-law incidents of all corporations.") (citing 1 JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 240 (4th ed. 1890)); Ellison v. Aldermen of
Raleigh, 89 N.C. 125, 128 (1883) (recognizing that a municipal corporation has the
inherent power of amotion to be exercised by its governing board).

6. 89 N.C. at 128.
7. Id. at 126-28.
8. Id. at 127. The transcript of the resolution was not introduced at trial.

9. Id.
10. Id. at 129 (citing 1 DILLON, supra note 5, § 179) (emphasis added).
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cise of inherent corporate authority ... may be essential to attaining the

ends for which the corporationwas formed."11 Furthermore, the court
explained, "there can be no serious doubt of the right of a corporate
body to vacate the seat of a corporate officer for adequate causes arising subsequent to taking his seat."12 Ultimately, the plaintiff was not
entitled to a writ of mandamus. 13 In fact, the plaintiff requested the
wrong relief; the appropriate remedy would have been for the plaintiff
to file a quo warranto action, 1 4 naming his successor in office.1 5 The
discussion of amotion was significant, however, because Ellison recognized the right of removal of an elected official for cause.' 6
State ex rel. Burke v. Jenkins, a 1908 supreme court decision, is
another important case recognizing the inherent power of amotion.
The decision recognized that "for cause and upon notice," the "power
to remove a corporate officer from his office ... is one of the common-

law incidents of all corporations."1 7 The court explained that
[t]his doctrine .. .has been considered settled ever since Lord Mans-

field's judgment ..."that there can be no power of amotion unless
given by charter or prescription, and the contrary doctrine is asserted
that from the reason of the thing, from the nature of corporations, and
for the sake of order and government, the power is incidental." .
Such action could not be taken without notice and an opportunity to
be heard, except where the officer is removable without cause at the
will of the appointing power ....

Trial by jury is not necessary in a

18
motion from office.
Jenkins involved a quo warranto action regarding "the right of the
town commissioners to remove an official for cause and upon
notice."' 9 The plaintiff, who was the town's elected treasurer, paid a
claim against the town despite being forbidden from doing so by the
town commissioners.20 The board demanded the return of the money,
indicating to the plaintiff that he would be removed from office if he

11.
12.
13.
14.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See

(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
at 127 (citing Rex v. Richardson, (1756) 1 Burr., 517, 539 (K.B.) (Eng.)).
at 138.
infra Part I.B.1. In Doyle v. Aldermen of Raleigh, 89 N.C. 133, 134-36

(1883), a case decided in the same term as Ellison, the plaintiff followed the correct
procedure for regaining his position by bringing a mandamus claim. For a complete
discussion of Doyle, see infra note 80.
15. Ellison, 89 N.C. at 129-33.
16. Id. at 128 (emphasis added).

17. State ex rel. Burke v. Jenkins, 61 S.E. 608, 609 (N.C. 1908).
18. Id. (citations omitted).
19. Id. at 608.

20. Id.
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failed to produce it. 2 1 In so doing, the board provided the plaintiff
with abundant notice with respect to both the process and circumstances of his potential removal.2 2 It twice ordered the plaintiff to
replace the money in the treasury at a town meeting.2 3 The board also
adopted and served him with a notice stating that if he failed to refund
the money to the town treasury, his office would be declared vacantbut he still refused to obey the order.2 4 A resolution was adopted
requesting him to resign and requiring the tax collector to pay over all
collections to the chairman of the finance committee.2 5 A copy of that
resolution was served on the tax collector and the plaintiff. 26 The
bond tendered by the plaintiff was rejected and returned to him, and
27
the reasons were recorded in the board minutes.
At a subsequent board meeting, the board voted to remove the
plaintiff from office. 28 The grounds cited for his removal were numerous: the plaintiff had treated the board with contempt, refused to turn
in to the treasury money which was paid contrary to the board's
instructions, continuously refused to appear before the board despite
repeated requests, and claimed he had the right and authority to exercise his own discretion regarding when and to whom he should pay
money. 29 The board voted that the plaintiff be suspended for misappropriation of the money and for disobedience of the vote and order of
the board. 30 The plaintiff brought a quo warranto action, naming as
defendant the individual who had been elected to replace him as town
treasurer. 3 ' After the trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff, the
defendant filed an appeal.3 2
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 609.
See id.
Id.
Id.

25. Id.

26. Id.
27. Id. at 608-09.
28. Id. at 609.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. The plaintiff was instructed in the board's resolution and unanimous vote
to turn over all money, papers, books, documents, and anything of value in his possession connected with his former position as town treasurer. The resolution instructed
and commanded the mayor to furnish the plaintiff with a certified copy of the resolution, and to take any further and necessary steps to ensure compliance with the
instructions. The plaintiff had notice and was duly notified of the board's meetings,
orders, and resolutions. Id. at 608-09.
32. Id. at 609.
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The question on appeal concerned "the right of the town commissioners to remove an official for cause and upon notice."3 3 The
supreme court reversed the trial court's decision, because sufficient
cause had been shown for his removal from office based upon misconduct and because he had been given full notice and an opportunity to
be heard. 34 In reaching its decision, the court emphasized the requirements of "notice given and opportunity to be heard" and "sufficient
cause shown" for removal, while also recognizing the important need
for municipal commissioners to supervise and control municipal
funds. The court explained that
in this case there was the fullest notice given and opportunity to be heard
and sufficient cause shown. If the town commissioners have not supervision of the town funds, if indeed they are not responsible for an oversight and control of the disbursement
thereof, their duties and powers
35
are of small importance.
Although Ellison's and Jenkins' recognition of the intrinsic power
of amotion dates back for more than a century, no subsequent cases
have undermined these decisions' validity. Their reasoning is sound
and they remain good law.3 6
A municipal corporation's inherent power of amotion was also
recognized by McQuillin in the original edition of The Law of Municipal
Corporations, which stated that "[ulnless mentioned in the constitution, municipal officers are corporate officers and not constitutional
officers, and the power to remove such officers for just cause, whether
so declared in the charter or applicable legislative act or not, is inherent in municipal corporations."37
33. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 18.
34. Id.
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. For a decision in which the Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the
facts and determined that they did not call for amotion from the office of sheriff, see

People ex rel. Worley v. Smith, 81 N.C. 304, 305-09 (1879) (holding that although it
was improper for the commissioners to induct the defendant sheriff into office without
his giving all required bonds, he was legally holding office and the defect was subsequently removed by his furnishing of the necessary tax bonds; therefore, the situation
did not call for his amotion from the office of sheriff).
37. EUGENE McQUILLIN, A TREATISE ON THE THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§ 12.230 (1911). Consistent with McQuillin's distinction between municipal officers

as corporate officers, as distinguished from constitutional officers, this Article does
not address the removal of elected judicial officials and accompanying concerns arising under the North Carolina Constitution in that context. See, e.g., Reid v. Mayor &
Bd. of Comm'rs of Town of Pilot Mountain, 85 S.E.2d 872, 873-75 (N.C. 1955) (holding that the town mayor and board of commissioners of Pilot Mountain did not have
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In Stephens v. Dowell, the supreme court cited the rule established
in Jenkins, emphasizing the necessity for providing "notice and an
opportunity to be heard" before removal of an elected municipal official "for reasonable and just cause."' 38 The supreme court emphasized
that rather than engaging in any "summary dismissal" of an individual
from elected office, it is "a fundamental principle of [North Carolina]
jurisprudence" to provide an elected official with "notice and an
opportunity to be heard." The court went on to hold that the plaintiff
was improperly removed from office:
The charter of the city of Raleigh provides that "[tihe commissioners of the city of Raleigh shall elect ... and a clerk of said court." If the
commissioners had a right to remove the clerk they had elected "on
account of inattention to duty," notice and an opportunity to be heard
should have been given him. This was not done-he was summarily
dismissed and Paul S. Dowell appointed to fill the office, "the change to
take effect immediately." We do not think under the act in which the
clerk was elected the commissioners had the authority and power to
summarily dismiss him without notice and an opportunity to be
heard.3 9
Although Dowell is the most recent North Carolina case specifically using the term "amotion" concerning the removal of a municipal
official from office, two recent supreme court decisions have implicitly
recognized the continued availability of "corrective action" for "offending officials" including "the removal of those who were elected."4 On
issues relating to the public policy in North Carolina against awarding
punitive damages against a municipality, a 1982 decision, Long v. City
of Charlotte, and a 1986 decision, Jackson v. Housing Authority of the
City of High Point, each state: "Likewise, there is no reason to suppose
that corrective action such as discharge of the offending officials who
were appointed or the removal of those who were elected will occur simply because punitive damages are awarded against the municipality.'
power to remove plaintiff as the duly elected judge of the mayor's court for the town,
which was an established court of record inferior to the supreme court).
38. 181 S.E. 629, 632-33 (N.C. 1935).
39. Id. (alterations in original).
40. See Jackson v. Hous. Auth. of High Point, 341 S.E.2d 523, 529 (N.C. 1986)
(Meyer, J., dissenting); Long v. City of Charlotte, 293 S.E.2d 101, 114 (N.C. 1982).
Note that the decision in Long was distinguished on other grounds in Smith v. City of
Charlotte, 339 S.E.2d 844, 846-49 (1986), among other cases, but the language in
Long regarding the point cited remains undisturbed.
41. Jackson, 341 S.E.2d at 529 (Meyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citing
Newport v. Facts Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 268-69 (1981)); Long, 293 S.E.2d at
114 (same).
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North Carolina Law DistinguishingAmotion, Quo Warranto,
and Mandamus

Under North Carolina law, there are several methods for removing
an elected municipal official from office,42 including but not limited to
the common law process of amotion and a statutoiy action in quo warranto.4 3 It is important to distinguish amotion from other actions originally recognized at common law affecting elected officials, such as
quo warranto and a writ of mandamus. These actions, which derive
their legitimacy from the sovereignty of the state itself, are now statutorily codified, with clearly defined procedures.
In order to provide a clear understanding of the distinctions
between actions for amotion, quo warranto, and mandamus in terms of
their purposes and applications, the following North Carolina cases
distinguish among them, although at times the discussions in the various decisions seem to blur their lines of distinction. Note that
although cases addressing separate procedures for quo warranto and
mandamus derive their source of authority differently from amotion,
they all reflect similar general due process concerns regarding providing notice and an opportunity to be heard before an elected municipal
official may be removed from office.
The process of amotion is closely related to a statutory action in
quo warranto,44 which is brought to challenge an official's title or legal
qualification to hold office.45 Although amotion and quo warranto are
both addressed in this Article because it is necessary to distinguish
between them and understand the reason for their differences, the primary focus of this Article is on using the process of amotion to remove
an elected municipal official from office for just cause.

42. For a review of other potential methods of removing local elected officials from
office in North Carolina, and for additional discussion of the distinctions between an
action in quo warranto and the process of amotion, see David M. Lawrence, Removing
Local Elected Officials From Office in North Carolina, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 547,
547-61 (1980).
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-514, -515, -516, -522, -528 (2007).
44. See id. §§ 1-515, -516.
45. See, e.g., Wooten v. Smith, 59 S.E. 649, 650 (N.C. 1907) (affirming a judgment
dismissing an action in quo warranto to determine the defendant's rights to simultaneously hold the office of recorder of the City of Charlotte and to act as the public
administrator of Mecklenburg County).
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1. Distinctions Between the Process of Amotion and an
Action in Quo Warranto
At common law, amotion referred to the removal of a governing
official for cause by the corporation, and quo warranto (literally, "by
what right") was originally a writ by which the British Crown could
demand that the person toward whom it was directed show cause for
exercising some authority. 4 6 Later, the English courts developed a private writ. 47 It is important to distinguish the process of exercising a

municipal corporation's inherent power of amotion from bringing a
statutory action in quo warranto because the two have distinct purposes and different time frames in which they can be pursued.
With regard to the different purposes of amotion and quo warranto, amotion typically focuses on removal of an elected official for
"reasonable and just cause" concerning the municipal official's misconduct or lack of fitness to hold office subsequent to his election.4 8
In contrast, the primary purpose of an action in quo warranto is to
challenge the official's title or legal capacity or qualification to hold
office.4 9
With regard to the different time frames in which amotion and
quo warranto can be pursued, the common law process of amotion
does not have a strict time limitation and can be pursued at any time
after induction into office.50 Amotion can address a municipal official's misconduct occurring at any time relevant to his election, induction into, or serving of his term of office, although it usually relates to
misconduct occurring after commencement of a term of elected
office. 5 ' In contrast, the ability to bring a statutory action in quo warranto to challenge the issue of legal capacity or qualification to hold
elected office is significantly constrained by the time limitation in section 1-522, which not only requires that an action be filed within
ninety days after the official's induction into office, but also requires
46. Amotion was discussed in an old English case decided by Lord Mansfield in
Rex v. Richardson, (1756) 1 Burr., 517, 539 (K.B.) (Eng.). Edward I issued the first quo
warranto writs to recover land lost by his father, Henry III.
47. For a discussion of the development of the writ of quo warranto in the English
courts, see Newman v. United States ex rel. Frizzel, 238 U.S. 537, 543-44 (1915).
48. See State ex rel. Burke v. Jenkins, 61 S.E. 608, 609 (N.C. 1908) ("The power to
remove a corporate officer from his office for reasonable and just cause is one of the
common-law incidents of all corporations.").
49. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-515, -516.
50. The process of amotion is not bound by the ninety-day limitation set forth in
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-522.
51. See Jenkins, 61 S.E. at 609; Ellison v. Aldermen of Raleigh, 89 N.C. 125, 128
(1883).
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actual service of the summons and complaint within the same initial
ninety-day period.52
North Carolina's statutory procedure for bringing an action in quo
warranto to challenge a person's title to a public office or to challenge
his legal capacity or qualification to hold office is fairly straightforward as codified under sections 1-514,13 1-515, 54 1-516, 55 1-522,56
and 1-528, 57 of the North Carolina General Statutes. A statutory
action in quo warranto can be brought in the name of the State under
52. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-522.
53. Section 1-514 provides:
The writs of scire facias and of quo warranto, and proceedings by information in the nature of quo warranto, are abolished; and the remedies obtainable in those forms may be obtained by civil actions under this Article. To the
extent that rules of procedure are not provided for in this Article, the Rules of
Civil Procedure shall apply.
Id. § 1-514.
54. Section 1-515 provides:
An action may be brought by the Attorney General in the name of the State,
upon his own information or upon the complaint of a private party, against
the party offending, in the following cases:
(1) When a person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises any public office, civil or military, or any franchise within this State, or
any office in a corporation created by the authority of this State; or,
(2) When a public officer, civil or military, has done or suffered an act
which, by law, makes a forfeiture of his office.
(3) When any person, natural or. corporate, has or claims to have or
hold any rights or franchises by reason of a grant or otherwise, in violation of
the provisions of G.S. 146-39.
Id. § 1-515.
55. Section § 1-516 provides:
When application is made to the Attorney General by a private relator to
bring such an action, he shall grant leave that it may be brought in the name
of the State, upon the relation of such applicant, upon the applicant tendering
to the Attorney General satisfactory security to indemnify the State against all
costs and expenses which may accrue in consequence of the action.
Id. § 1-516.
56. Section 1-522 provides:
All actions brought by a private relator, upon the leave of the Attorney General, to try the title to an office must be brought, and a copy of the complaint
served on the defendant, within ninety days after his induction into the office to
which the title is to be tried; and when it appears from the papers in the cause,
or is otherwise shown to the satisfaction of the court, that the summons and
complaint have not been served within ninety days, it is the duty of the judge
upon motion of defendant to dismiss the action at any time before the trial, at
the cost of the plaintiff.
Id. § 1-522 (emphasis added).
57. Section 1-528 provides:
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section 1-515, or by a private person with leave of the State under section 1-516, to challenge a municipal official's legal capacity or qualification to hold office.58
An action in quo warranto is not the appropriate procedure for
challenging all office holders. For example, in Ledwell v. Proctor, the
supreme court considered an appeal of a quo warranto action. 5 9 The
plaintiff "relator ' 60 sought to be declared the duly elected town alderman for a two-year term, to have the defendant ousted, and to recover
all benefits received by the defendant from the elected office. 6 1 The
supreme court ruled that a contestant for public office may not maintain a quo warranto action by merely alleging that election returns have
shown that he received a majority of the votes cast, without further
alleging that the returns have been canvassed, that the canvass has
shown and declared him the duly elected candidate, and that a certificate of election was thereby issued to him.6 2
In Williams v. Somers, which involved an action in quo warranto,
the supreme court considered a case in which a new clerk had been
elected clerk of superior court. 63 The new clerk timely and properly
tendered his bonds and was inducted into office. 64 The former clerk
was present in court at the time, was cognizant of what was occurring,
and did not object. 6 5 The former clerk surrendered his office and
records to the new clerk and retired from his official duties for twelve
months.6 6 The court held that the conduct of the former clerk
amounted to a surrender of his office to the court, justified the recepIn any civil action brought to try the title or right to hold any office, when the
judgment of the court is in favor of the relator in the action, it is the duty of
the court to issue a writ of mandamus or such other process as is necessary
and proper to carry the judgment into effect, and to induct the party entitled
into office.
Id. § 1-528.
58. See id. §§ 1-515, -516.
59. Ledwell v. Proctor, 19 S.E.2d 234, 235-36 (N.C. 1942).
60. A "relator" serves as the plaintiff in a quo warranto action, claiming that he has
a legal right to the office claimed and that it is the duty of the defendant office holder
to render it to him. A quo warranto action can be filed by a "private relator" upon leave
of the Attorney General, or it can be filed by the Attorney General in the name of the
State. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-515, -516.
61. Ledwell, 19 S.E.2d at 235.
62. Id. at 235-36.
63. Williams v. Somers, 18 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat.) 61, 61-62 (1834).
64. Id. at 61.
65. Id. at 64.
66. Id. at 65.
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tion and induction into office of the newly elected clerk, and the office
could not thereafter be properly challenged.67
In State ex rel. Barker v. Ellis, the court of appeals determined that

an unsuccessful mayoral candidate had ample opportunity to be heard
and was not denied due process by the ninety-day service requirement
applicable to a quo warranto action. 68 The unsuccessful candidate
filed administrative appeals and direct actions to overturn election
results that delayed the mayor's swearing-in. 69 The unsuccessful candidate waited nearly two months before seeking permission from the
Attorney General to institute a private quo warranto action and was
granted permission to file nearly three weeks before the end of the
ninety-day limitation period.7 ° The court held that the time for service
of the summons and complaint could not be extended under the North
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure because the requirement that a private quo warranto action must be served on the mayor within ninety
days of induction into office was prescribed by statute instead of being
governed by the rules of civil procedure. 7 ' Although the specific issue
in Ellis concerned the inapplicability of the rules of civil procedure to
alter the ninety-day service requirement applicable to a quo warranto
action, the court's ruling also held that the unsuccessful candidate had
ample opportunity to be heard and was not denied due process.72
The ninety-day requirement for an action in quo warrantowas also
upheld in State ex rel. Long v. Smitherman.7 3 In Long, a private relator

filed a quo warranto action to determine his right to the office of
county sheriff and to challenge the defendant's right and title to the
office.7 4 The court held that the action was properly dismissed
because the summons and complaint were not filed within
ninety days
75
after the defendant's induction into the office of sheriff.
2.

Distinctions Between an Action in Quo Warranto and an
Action for Mandamus

In Lyon v. Commissioners of Granville County,7 6 the supreme court
distinguished an action in the nature of quo warranto from an action
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
State ex rel. Barker v. Ellis, 547 S.E.2d 166, 167-69 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 167.
Id. at 169.
Id. at 168.
Id. at 167-69.
State ex rel. Long v. Smitherman, 111 S.E.2d 834, 835-36 (N.C. 1960).
Id. at 834-35.
Id.
Lyon v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Granville County, 26 S.E. 929 (N.C. 1897).
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for mandamus. 77 The court held that where a plaintiff sues for an
office occupied by another, his remedy is an action in the nature of quo
warranto. 7 But "if he sues to be restored to an unoccupied office, his
remedy is an action for mandamus, and he must show that he had a
present, clear, legal right to the thing claimed and that it is the duty of
the defendant to render it to him." 79 The court in Lyon explained the
following distinction between an action in quo warranto and an action
for mandamus:
When a plaintiff sues for an office occupied by another, quo warranto is the proper remedy... ; but when the office is vacant by reason
of a motion, the remedy is mandamus .... "Mandamus is a proceeding to compel a defendant to perform a duty which is owing to the
plaintiff, and can be maintained only on the ground that the relator
has a present, clear, legal right to the thing claimed, and that it is the
duty of the defendant to render it to him." . . . . "It is to be borne in
mind that the rule as above stated is applied only in favor of those who
are clearly entitled de jure to the office from which they have been
removed. And when the writ is sought to compel the restoration of one
claiming the right to an office, it is not sufficient for him to show that
he is the officer de facto, but it is also incumbent upon him to show a
clear, legal right; and, failing in this, he is not entitled to the peremptory writ."

°

77. Id. at 930 ("When a plaintiff sues for an office occupied by another, quo warranto is the proper remedy.., but when the office is vacant by reason of a motion, the
). Mandamus was another common law prerogative writ
remedy is mandamus ....
that took the form of a remedy.
78. See id. at 929 ("Where a plaintiff sues for an office occupied by another, his
remedy is an action in the nature of quo warranto. If he sues to be restored to an
unoccupied office, his remedy is an action for a mandamus, and he must show that he
had a present, clear, legal right to the thing claimed, and that it is the duty of the
defendant to render it to him.").

79. Id.
80. Id. at 930 (citations omitted). Doyle v. Aldermen of Raleigh, 89 N.C. 133
(1883), the case discussed in Lyon, was decided in the same term as Ellison. See supra
Part I (addressing Ellison). In Doyle, the plaintiff was an elected city alderman who,
after taking oath of office and meeting with fellow board members, was removed by a
board resolution on the grounds of constitutional "incompetency" to hold office. See
89 N.C. at 134. Since there was no successor yet chosen to occupy the vacant position,
the plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus to be restored to his office. Id. The supreme
court determined a writ of mandamus was an appropriate remedy for restoration to
his office, reasoning that his appointment from the treasury department of the United
States as a night watchman for the city post office did not render him constitutionally
ineligible to hold local office simultaneously as a city alderman. Id. at 136. The court
recognized that prohibition on the holding of two offices was to prevent a single person's accumulation of multiple offices and places of public trust. See id. However, the
court did not consider the plaintiffs night watchman position as holding an office that

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2009

13

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 3

CAMPBELL LAW REVrEw

[Vol. 32:75

In Rhodes v. Love, the supreme court further explained the difference between an action in quo warranto and an action in mandamus.
The plaintiff alleged that he was the duly elected and qualified treasurer of the Lincolnton Graded School Committee Corporation and
that the defendant had the books, documents, and papers of the office
in his possession but refused to deliver them to plaintiff.,, The plaintiff sought a mandamus to compel the defendant to turn over the
books and records.8 2 The defendant moved to dismiss the action on
the ground that the plaintiffs alleged remedy, if at all, would be by quo
warranto and not by mandamus. 8 3 The trial court in Rhodes dismissed
the action, and the supreme court affirmed, explaining the difference
between a mandamus proceeding and an action in quo warranto as
follows:
We think the plaintiff has misconceived his remedy. It is evident, from
the pleadings, that this is, in substance, an action by two contesting
claimants to determine the title to an office and mandamus is not the
proper proceeding in such a case. If an office is vacated and the rightful claimant seeks to be inducted into it by the body having jurisdiction of the matter, mandamus will lie to enforce his right, but where
the controversy is between two rival claimants, the preferential right of
the plaintiff must not only be clear, but it must be so adjudged in an
action of quo warranto, or rather in an action in the nature of quo
warranto, and especially is this true where the defendant is in possession of the office under a claim of right in him to hold it and exercise
its functions or perform its duties. Although the proceeding may be in
the name of the state upon the relation or complaint of a private party,
it is none the less personal as to the parties claiming
the office; the
84
issue between them being the right to the same.
As shown by the decision in Rhodes, an action in mandamus is
not the proper proceeding to resolve an action between two claimants
who are contesting title to an office. Mandamus will only be appropriate if an office is still vacant and a rightful claimant seeks to be
inducted into the office by the proper municipal body. However,
prevented him from also occupying a seat on the city board of aldermen. Id. Agreeing
with the plaintiff, the court held that because his seat remained vacant, he could
obtain a writ of mandamus in order to be restored to his former position. Id. at

134-36.
81. Rhodes v. Love, 69 S.E. 436, 436 (N.C. 1910).

82. Id.
83. Id. at 437.
84. Id. (citing State ex rel. Burke v. Comm'rs of Bessemer County, 61 S.E. 609
(N.C. 1908); Ellison v. Aldermen of Raleigh, 89 N.C. 125 (1883); Brown v. Turner, 70
N.C. 93 (1874); Howerton v. Tate, 66 N.C. 231 (1872)).
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where the controversy is between two rival claimants, and the individual defending his right to hold the office is already in possession of the
office, the plaintiff challenging the defendant's right to hold the office
8s Even though a quo
must file an action in the nature of quo warranto.
warranto proceeding may be filed in the name of the state upon the
relation or complaint of a private party, it is still a personal action
concerning each of the parties who are claiming the right to hold the
office.8 6
In State ex rel Freeman v. Ponder, the supreme court explained the
procedure for bringing an action in quo warranto to challenge a person's title to a public office or to challenge his legal capacity or qualification to hold office:
The statutes codified as Article 41 of Chapter 1 of the General Statutes
prescribe a specific mode for trying the title to a public office. Such
relief is to be sought in a civil action. But a private person cannot
institute or maintain an action of this character in his own name or
upon his own authority, even though he be a claimant of the office.
The action must be brought and prosecuted in the name of the state by
the Attorney-General; or in the name of the state upon the relation of a
private person, who claims to be entitled to the office, or in the name
of the State upon the relation of a private person, who is a citizen and
taxpayer of the jurisdiction where the officer is to exercise his duties
and powers. Before any private person can commence or maintain an

action of this nature in the capacity of a relator, he must apply to the
Attorney-General for permission to bring the action, tender to the
Attorney-General satisfactory security to indemnify the State against
all costs and expenses incident to the action, and obtain leave from the

Attorney-General to bring the action in the name of the State upon his
relation. A single action may be brought against all persons claiming
the same office to try their respective rights to the office." 7
3.

Distinctions Between an Action in Quo Warranto and a

DeclaratoryJudgment Action
In Comer v. Ammons, the court of appeals explained the purpose
of an action in quo warranto and distinguished it from a declaratory
judgment action.8 8 In Comer, a registered voter sued several elected
district court judges seeking a declaration that the statutes allowing
the judges to simultaneously run for superior court and district court
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. State ex rel. Freeman v. Ponder, 67 S.E.2d 292, 298 (N.C. 1951) (citations
omitted).
88. Comer v. Ammons, 522 S.E.2d 77, 80-81 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999).
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judgeships were unconstitutional.8 9 The issue in Comer was that sec-

tions 163-106 and 163-323, when considered together, created a loophole allowing a candidate to run for a superior court seat and another
office on the same election day, regardless of the filing periods. 90
The court of appeals held the statute that codifies the commonlaw doctrine of quo warranto did not apply because the voter was not
directly challenging the election or its results, but rather the main
thrust of his argument was that the election statutes themselves were
unconstitutional.9 1 The court upheld the constitutionality of the statutes and affirmed summary judgment in favor of the elected defendant
judges.9 2 The significance of the Comer decision is that an action in
quo warranto is not an appropriate procedure to challenge the application of election statutes where the complaining party is not directly
challenging an election or its results, but rather is arguing that the election statutes themselves are unconstitutional, which should be
addressed in a declaratory judgment action.
II.

AmOTION'S APPLICABILITY TO OTHER OFFICIALS IN NORTH CAROLINA
AND TO ELECTED OFFICIALS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

A.

Utilizing Amotion for Removal of Appointed Officials in
North Carolina

In Russ v. Board of Education of Brunswick County, a 1950 decision, the Supreme Court of North Carolina examined the utilization of
amotion in a school board case that did not involve the removal of
elected municipal officials from office, but did involve the amotion
concepts of just cause, notice, and the opportunity to be heard-procedures that are consistent with protecting individual due process
rights. 93 The court examined the ability of a county board of education to remove an appointed member of a school committee and determined that "the statutory proceeding for the amotion of a school
committeeman is judicial or quasi-judicial in character, and for that
reason an ousted committeeman is entitled to have the action of the
county board of education reviewed in the Superior Court."9 4 The
Russ court provided an instructive summary regarding what needed to
be done by a county board of education during the process of amotion
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 81.
Id.
Id. at 80-81.
Id. at 83-84.

93. 59 S.E.2d 589, 590-92 (N.C. 1950).
94. Id. at 590.
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to effect removal of a school committeeman, specifying that he "shall

be given notice of the proceeding, and of the charges against him, and
afforded an opportunity to be heard and to produce testimony in his
defense," and that he shall not be removed from office unless the
county board of education "determines after a full and fair hearing on
the merits that one or more of the specified causes for removal has
been established by the evidence."9'
In addressing the issue regarding the manner in which an ousted
school committeeman can obtain court review of an action by the
county board of education in removing him from office, the supreme
court observed:
[Section] 1-269 expressly stipulates that "writs of certiorari

..

are

authorized as heretofore in use." It is well settled in this jurisdiction
that certiorari is the appropriate process to review the proceedings of
inferior courts and of bodies and officers exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions in cases where no appeal is provided by law. Hence,
we conclude that the Superior Court, which is the highest court of
original jurisdiction in this State, has the power to review by certiorari
the action of a county board of education in removing a school committeeman from his office.
This decision finds full support in well considered cases in other
States holding that when a governmental agency has power to remove a
public officer only for cause after a hearing, the ouster proceeding is
judicial or quasi-judicial in its nature, and may be reviewed by
certiorari.96
This conclusion is supported by authority generally observing
that, "[clertiorari will lie to review the act of a governmental agency in
removing a public officer when such removal is based on an order
entered after a hearing at which the respondent is given an opportunity
95. Id. As the supreme court went on to explain,
[t]he law clearly contemplates that any school committeeman against whom
the statutory proceeding for removal is brought shall be given notice of the
proceeding, and of the charges against him, and afforded an opportunity to
be heard and to produce testimony in his defense, and that the county board
of education shall not remove him from his office unless it determines after a
full and fair hearing on the merits that one or more of the specified causes for
removal has been established by the evidence. This being true, the statutory
proceeding for the amotion of a school committeeman is judicial or quasijudicial in character, and for that reason an ousted committeeman is entitled
to have the action of the county board of education reviewed in the Superior
Court. It is noted, in passing, that the board is required by law to keep minutes of its meetings.
Id. at 590-91 (citation omitted).
96. Id. at 591-92 (citations omitted) (original emphasis omitted).
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to be heard. '97 The context of Russ concerned utilization of the process of amotion for removal of an appointed school committeeman,
specifically referring to statutory provisions applicable in that particular case under section 115-74,98 rather than addressing the removal of
an elected municipal official, which is the subject of this Article.
Despite these noted differences, it would nevertheless appear that
under the guidance expressed by the Supreme Court of North Carolina
in Russ, utilization of the following procedure would be consistent
with affording the same due process concerns reflected in prior amotion cases addressing the proper procedure for removal of an elected
municipal official: (1) the official should be given adequate notice of
the proceeding and of the charges against him; (2) he should be
afforded an opportunity to be heard and to produce testimony in his
defense; (3) he should not be removed from office unless it is determined after a full and fair hearing on the merits that reasonable and
just cause for removal has been established by the evidence; (4) minutes should be kept of the meetings; and (5) since the proceeding for
amotion is judicial or quasi-judicial in character, the ousted municipal
official should be entitled to have the action reviewed in superior
court. 9 9

B.

Decisions from Other JurisdictionsAddressing Removal
of Elected Officials

Cases from jurisdictions outside of North Carolina have approved
and utilized the process of amotion or quo warranto under the laws of
their respective states, while also showing concern for protection of the
due process rights of the official removed. As in North Carolina,
courts from other jurisdictions have been careful to ensure that the
procedure applied during the removal process respects the due process
rights of the municipal official removed from his position. The following cases from jurisdictions outside of North Carolina address similar
due process concerns and requirements under their respective state
common law, statutes, and constitutions.
97. 24 STRONG'S NORTH CAROLINA INDEX 4TH, Public Officers and Employees § 33
(2008). But see Stephens v. Dowell, 181 S.E. 629, 632 (N.C. 1935) ("[Wlhen the amotion is allowable only for cause, the soundness of such cause is reviewable by the
courts upon a quo warranto.") (citing State ex rel. Burke v. Jenkins, 61 S.E. 608, 609

(N.C. 1908)).
98. Russ, 59 S.E.2d at 590. Chapter 115 of the North Carolina General Statutes
has since been repealed.
99. See id. at 590-91.
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People ex rel. City of Kankakee v. Morris illustrates the propriety of
bringing a quo warranto action to remove an elected official from office
because the public's interest in maintaining confidence in good government with reputable officials outweighs an individual's privilege to
hold office.' 0 0 In Morris, the defendant was elected as a municipal
alderman in Illinois. A few weeks later, he pleaded guilty to theft
under the Illinois Criminal Code for unlawful participation in the Federal food stamp program, for which he was sentenced to eighteen
months probation.' 1 The State filed a quo warrantoaction against the
alderman, alleging that his criminal conviction disqualified him from
holding office.' 0 2 After both parties filed summary judgment motions,
the trial court granted the State's motion and the alderman
appealed. 10 3 The Appellate Court for the Third District of Illinois held
that the alderman could be ousted from office for his felony theft conviction, even though he was sentenced to probation rather than to
prison. 10

4

The court reasoned that

[tihe expectation of attaining or holding public office.. . is a privilege,
not a civil right. Neither the right to governmental employment nor
the right to hold an elective office is fundamental. We are more concerned with the public interest in good government and confidence in
our public officers than defendant's privilege in holding his office. A
conviction for an infamous crime destroys the public confidence in an
elected official. Removal from office for committing an infamous
crime is not a punishment. Rather, it is simply a consequence of the
officer's failure to meet a condition imposed on him in furtherance of
the public interest in good government.
A felony is infamous when it is inconsistent with commonly
accepted principles of honesty and decency, or involves moral turpitude. Defendant's conduct certainly offends commonly accepted principles of honesty and decency. In effect, he attempted to defraud both
the Federal and state governments. His conviction
renders him infa10 5
mous, and he is ineligible to hold his office.
In Quinn v. City of Concord, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
reviewed a case in which a city mayor filed a petition for writ of certiorari in superior court to set aside the action of the city board of alder100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

See 467 N.E.2d 589, 590 (111. App. Ct. 1984).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 591-92.
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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men in removing him from office under the city charter. 10 6 After the
trial court set aside the aldermen's action and reinstated the mayor to
his office, the aldermen filed petitions requesting that the supreme
court "vacate the decision of the Superior Court and reinstate the decision of the board of alderman. 1 0 7 The court held that the hearing
before the city aldermen was conducted fairly, that the mayor's action
in his official capacity in directing a police officer to file a false report
with his superior constituted misconduct in office, and that the trial
court could not substitute its judgment for that of the city aldermen
regarding whether the misconduct was sufficient to justify the city
aldermen's removal of the mayor from office.'
The decision by the supreme court outlined the procedure that
had been followed for the mayor's removal from office.' 0 9 Following
the mayor's reported action in his official capacity in directing a police
officer to file a false report, the board of aldermen appointed a subcommittee to investigate the incident." 0 The subcommittee's report to
the full board resulted in a vote to suspend the mayor for misconduct
in office until a hearing on a later date.1 1 1 Upon the mayor's petition,
the trial court vacated the suspension order, but the hearing regarding
the mayor's removal proceeded as scheduled. 1 1 2 Prior to the hearing,
the board of aldermen delivered a copy of the charges against the
mayor to him by mail and in person. 113 The board of aldermen established rules for the conduct of the hearing, during which the mayor
was represented by counsel. 1 14 The board of alderman found the
mayor guilty of misconduct after a hearing and removed him from
office.

11 5

On petition for certiorari, the trial court's review was limited to
two questions: "[First,] [wias Mayor Quinn given a fair hearing before
the removal action was taken? [Second,] [did the facts on which the
charge of misconduct in office was based legally constitute a sufficient
cause for removal of the Mayor from office?"' 11 6 The trial court ruled
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

233 A.2d 106, 107 (N.H. 1967).
Id.
Id. at 108-10.
Id. at 107.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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that Mayor Quinn was given a fair hearing but the facts of the case were
11 7
insufficient to support removing the mayor from office.
On appeal, the rulings were presented to the supreme court
together with complete transcripts of the hearings before the board of
aldermen and the trial court." 8 The city charter provided that the
board of aldermen could remove the mayor from office for prolonged
absence, inattention to duty, mental or physical incapacity, incompetency, crime, immorality, or misconduct by vote as long as at least ten
aldermen were present. 1 9 The mayor-argued that the removal process
was unfair due to an alleged conspiracy to extricate him from his office
along with allegations of prejudice by a number of aldermen. 120 His
counsel examined nine of the fourteen aldermen before the trial court
and other witnesses were also presented to support the charge.' 2 '
After hearing the evidence, the trial court found that the hearing was
fair, that all of the aldermen in question were eligible to participate in
the proceeding, and that the mayor's opportunity to defend himself
was more than adequate.' 2 2
The supreme court determined the evidence supported the trial
court's findings and rulings. The court observed that the city charter
provided the tribunal and prescribed the standards for removal. 12 3 It
held that all of the procedures required by the statute were adequate
1 24
and that the procedures were followed correctly.
Rejecting the mayor's argument of unfairness and prejudice, the
court noted that the charter prescribed a tribunal whose members
would always be acquainted with the parties and would have some
knowledge of the facts. 1 25 In this respect, it was different from the
ordinary approach of using a judge and jury. 1 2 6 "It has been generally
held for example that aldermen are not disqualified from voting on
charges because they served on a committee that formulated the
charges."' 1 27 The court stated:
Findings which result from an unfair hearing or a prejudiced tribunal
will not be sustained. However, it must be recognized that in this case
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id. at 108.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

126. Id.
127. Id.
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the Legislature intended removal proceedings to be conducted by the
aldermen who may bring the charge and some of whom may have substantial knowledge of the evidence to be presented, or may have had
differences from time to time with the person whose removal is
sought. 128

The court continued:
The Trial Court correctly held that certiorari may not be invoked to
review findings of fact and that the Court was limited to an inquiry of
law whether the finding or verdict could reasonably be made. Unless
the evidence shows that the conclusion could not have been reasona1 29
bly reached, the action taken will be held valid.
In light of these principles, the supreme court determined that the
trial court had been wrong to substitute its judgment for that of the
city aldermen, and explained that
[tihe fact that another tribunal might find that the misconduct was not
such as to justify removal does not permit a substitution of the judgment of others for that of the board of aldermen where the charter
leaves this judgment to them.
for

The charter states that "The board of aldermen may ... remove...
misconduct in office." Whether or not misconduct is "such

. . .

misconduct" as to justify removal is therefore left to 13the
aldermen and
0
this court will not disturb their finding that it was.
For these reasons, the petition for writ of supersedeas was dismissed,
the petition for writ of certiorari was granted, and the order of the trial
131
court was set aside.
The decisions in Morris and Quinn are consistent with North Carolina decisions holding that if the requisite steps are taken to provide
notice and an opportunity for a fair hearing on the merits to ensure
that the evidence establishes reasonable and just cause for removal,
then elected officials can be removed by a municipal governing body
through the process of amotion.
III.

SUGGESTED GUIDELINES FOR USING THE PROCESS OF AMOTION TO

REMOVE AN ELECTED MUNICIPAL OFFICIAL FROM OFFICE
FOR JUST CAUSE

Under North Carolina law, an elected official does not hold a
property interest" per se in his current or former position as an
128.
129.
130.
1952))

Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 110. (citing Sinkevich v. Nashua Police Comm'n, 86 A2d 562 (N.H.
(second and third alteration in original).

131. Id.
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elected officer because a public office is not considered to be "private
property." 13 2 In Mial v. Ellington, the supreme court professed "the
wisdom of holding that a public office is not private property, thus
preventing the state and its agencies from performing its functions in
respect to its internal government" and ensuring municipal officers do
1 33
not have a property interest in the state's sovereignty.
Notwithstanding the rule providing that "a public office is not private property," 13 4 Jenkins establishes that an elected municipal official
should be given notice and an opportunity to be heard and there
should be sufficient cause shown for his removal from office.' 3 5 The
Corpus Juris Secundum recognizes the requirement of notice and a
hearing in this context as follows:
When the tenure of a municipal officer is at the pleasure of the
appointing body, the power to remove may be exercised without notice
or hearing. Where the appointment, however, is for a fixed term or
during good behavior, or where the removal must be for cause, the
power of removal ordinarily can be exercised only on charges preferred, after notice and hearing, with a reasonable opportunity
to be
13 6
heard before the officer or body having the power to remove.
The cases discussed in this Article demonstrate that under North
Carolina law, an elected municipal official can be removed for misconduct subsequent to his election if a proper procedure is carried out for
his removal, including: giving adequate notice of a scheduled proceeding; providing an opportunity to be heard regarding the charges
against the official and to produce testimony in his defense; affording a
full and fair hearing on the merits; and documenting the proceedings
through recorded minutes. Since the process of amotion is considered
to be judicial or quasi-judicial in character, the ousted municipal offi132. See Mial v. Ellington, 46 S.E. 961, 971 (N.C. 1903).
133. Id. The Supreme Court of North Carolina's decision in Mial was cited in Smith
v. State, 209 S.E.2d 336, 338 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974), for the rule that a public office is
not private property and that the Legislature has power to abolish offices created by it.
Although the decision in Smith distinguished Mial on factual grounds because the
position which the plaintiff held in Smith was not abolished when his cause of action
arose, id., the underlying holding in Mial remains undisturbed. For another instance
in which public employment did not constitute a property interest, see Disher v.
Weaver, 308 F. Supp. 2d 614, 624-28 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (holding that where a city
adopted a city manager form of government giving the city manager the power to
remove all city employees, provisions of city's charter and ordinances providing a fixed
term of employment and certain procedures for discharge did not give city police
officer a property interest in her job protected by due process).
134. Mial, 46 S.E. at 971.
135. State ex rel. Burke v. Jenkins, 61 S.E. 608, 609 (N.C. 1908).
136. 62 CJ.S. Municipal Corporations § 426 (2008).
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cial should be entitled to have the action reviewed in superior court
through certiorari review, which should be limited to an inquiry of law
regarding whether the findings supporting the removal could reasonably have been made.
The following is a practical procedural guide for municipalities,
legal practitioners, and the courts that is consistent with the mutual
goal of protecting due process concerns and ensuring a fair and reasonable result. In order to satisfy due process concerns, the longstanding line of amotion cases require notice and an opportunity to be
heard before an elected municipal official can be removed from office
for just cause. Decisions such as Russ, which was decided in a nonmunicipal context, also focus on due process concerns prior to enabling removal of an official from office. Because the overriding concern in both contexts is one of ensuring due process for the official
during the removal process, from a jurisprudential standpoint, it
makes sense to apply the newer guidelines outlined in Russ to the
removal of an elected municipal official.
The collective wisdom of the decisions cited above' 37 demonstrates that it is reasonable and prudent to observe and maintain compliance with the following practical procedural guidelines for removal
of an elected municipal official for just cause. Please note that these
procedural guidelines are only practical suggestions by this author and
are not required under North Carolina law, except to the extent
expressly provided by the North Carolina decisions discussed above.
Naturally, if a municipality has specific procedures or guidelines
already in place under its own charter, by-laws, municipal code, ordinances, rules, or regulations addressing any of these matters, then the
municipality should follow them instead.
A. Give Adequate Notice of the Scheduled Proceeding and
Pending Charges
The municipal official should be given dated and signed written
notice of the date, time, and exact location of the scheduled proceeding and the specific charges pending against him. If there is a particular incident giving rise to the pending charges, the notice should
provide a clear, concise, and specific description of the date, time, and
particular facts surrounding the incident and regarding any violations,
improprieties, or breaches of duty alleged to have been committed or
137. E.g., Russ v. Bd. of Educ. of Brunswick County, 59 S.E.2d 589 (N.C. 1950);
State ex rel. Burke v. Jenkins, 61 S.E. 608 (N.C. 1908); Ellison v. Aldermen of Raleigh,
89 N.C. 125 (1883).
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to have arisen from the incident. If the official is represented by legal
counsel in the matter, a complete courtesy copy of the written notice
should also be provided to the municipal official's retained legal
counsel.
Regarding the manner of service of the written notice, out of an
abundance of caution, it is suggested (but not required) that notice be
sent by both regular United States mail and by certified mail, return
receipt requested, so that the municipality will have documented proof
regarding the date of the municipal official's receipt of the written
notice. Although written notice by email can serve as a supplemental
form of written notice in addition to regular or certified mail, it is not
suggested that email serve as the only form of written notice provided.
Of course, clear and complete copies should always be kept of all written notice given.
B.

Provide Meaningful Opportunity to Be Heard and to Produce
Testimony in Defense

The municipal official should be afforded a reasonable and meaningful opportunity to be heard and to gather and produce relevant evidence, to produce testimony and documents in his defense, and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses. If the municipality knows the
official is represented by legal counsel in the matter, a reasonable time
should be allowed prior to the scheduled hearing for the municipal
official's counsel to have sufficient time and opportunity to gather and
produce relevant documents and evidence, and to prepare for the
municipal official's testimony and examination and cross-examination
of other witnesses.
The amount of time that should be considered reasonable logically depends upon the nature, extent, and severity of the offense or
pending charges. Out of an abundance of caution, notice of at least a
few weeks or a month should be given to allow a reasonable time for
preparation prior to the scheduled hearing. No particular period of
advance notice is required, except as may be provided under the
municipality's own procedures or guidelines already in place under its
own charter, by-laws, municipal code, ordinances, rules, or
regulations.
C.

Make Determination Only Following a Full and Fair Hearing on
the Merits RegardingJust Cause

The municipal official should not be removed from office unless
and until it is determined after a full and fair hearing on the merits
that sufficient just cause for removal has been established by the evi-
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dence produced at the scheduled hearing. Particular attention should
be paid to strict compliance with any voting procedures that might be
required under the municipality's charter, by-laws, municipal code,
ordinances, rules, and regulations concerning the number of votes
required to reach a binding determination at the conclusion of the
hearing.
D.

Maintain Recorded Minutes of Removal-related Meetings

Recorded minutes should be kept of any meetings leading up to
the removal of an elected municipal official from office, with careful
attention paid to documenting all steps taken to ensure compliance
with customary procedures applicable to and employed by the governing municipal authority. Testimony and arguments presented at
the hearing should be recorded in their entirety whenever and however
possible to best preserve all testimonial and non-documentary evidence in the event that subsequent certiorari review becomes
necessary.
E.

CertiorariReview in Superior Court Should Be Limited to
Issues of Law

Since the process of amotion is considered judicial or quasi-judicial in character, the ousted municipal official should be entitled to
have the action reviewed in superior court through subsequent certiorari review, which should be limited to an inquiry of law regarding
whether the finding could reasonably have been made. The inquiry
should not extend to a review or substitution of judgment for findings
of fact, since the local municipal officials vested with authority for
making the determination regarding the factual basis for "just cause"
should be individuals who are nearest to the matters of concern as
they are occurring at the municipal level.
CONCLUSION

Since there is no statutory provision outlining the procedure for
removal of elected municipal officials for subsequent misconduct or
lack of fitness to hold office under state law, it is important that
municipal officials, practitioners, and the courts become familiar with
North Carolina common law addressing amotion as a municipal corporation's inherent power to remove an elected official for reasonable
and just cause.
Compliance with the following procedures for removal of an
elected municipal official through the process of amotion should
ensure a fair and reasonable result: (1) the official should be given
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adequate notice of the proceeding and of the charges against him;
(2) he should be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to produce
testimony in his defense; (3) he should not be removed from office
unless it is determined after a full and fair hearing on the merits that
reasonable and just cause for removal has been established by the evidence; (4) minutes should be kept of the meetings; and (5) since the
process for amotion is judicial or quasi-judicial in character, the
ousted municipal official should be entitled to have the action
reviewed in superior court through certiorari review, limited to an
inquiry of law regarding whether the finding could reasonably have
been made.
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